Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics
While downstream distribution and demand is likely to be hampered by the labor and income effects of COVID‐19, Canada is expected to produce over 88 million tons of grains and oilseeds in 2020. Canadians have valid concerns about delays related to their changing needs as millions move their purchases from food services to retail groceries, but they should not worry about our overall supply of calories. Despite some shortages, the supply chains for flour and cooking oil are not likely to be blocked for an extended period. Learning from the coordinated needs of the BSE crisis in the beef sector, the federal government developed Value Chain Roundtables in 2003, including one for grains. These roundtables bring together government and industry to tackle the issues that face each sector's major needs, including food safety, transportation infrastructure, and market access. A working group made up of various roundtable members was set up specifically to deal with COVID‐19‐related supply chain challenges. This gives both industry and government a venue to attack any choke point or breakdown within our agrifood supply chains—the exact response we need at this time. A preestablished forum for discussion of critical issues at these roundtables, assuming the right players are active and present, cannot hurt, but it would useful for future planners and researchers if the federal government could clarify any positive impact they have.
[学术文献] The COVID‐19 pandemic and agriculture: Short‐ and long‐run implications for international trade relations 进入全文
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics
The COVID‐19 pandemic has put unprecedented strain on food supply chains. Given the ever‐increasing degree of globalization, those supply chains very often stretch across international borders. In the short run, countries have largely been working to keep those supply chains intact and operating efficiently so that panic buying is cooled and shifts in consumption habits arising from personal isolation can be accommodated. Once the crisis has passed, based on what has been learned regarding the international food system's resilience, governments may wish to strengthen institutions that govern international trade. On the other hand, based on their COVID‐19 experience, governments may feel that they are too dependent on foreign sources of supply and may wish to reverse the impacts of globalization on their food systems. As a result, they may become increasingly isolationist, eschewing international cooperation. Which of these opposing forces will prevail may depend on the paths economies follow after the disequilibrium precipitated by the pandemic.
[学术文献] Do crop purchase programs improve smallholder welfare? The case of Zambia's Food Reserve Agency 进入全文
Government and parastatal crop purchase programs have regained popularity in sub‐Saharan Africa, with many citing improving smallholder farmers’ welfare as a key goal. Yet there is limited empirical evidence on the topic. This paper analyzes the effects of the Zambian Food Reserve Agency's (FRA's) maize purchase activities on smallholder welfare. The FRA buys maize at a pan‐territorial price that often exceeds market prices in surplus production areas. Using two household panel survey datasets spanning 15 years and exploiting variation in the scale of FRA activities over time, we employ fixed effects and control function approaches to estimate the effects of a smallholder household's maize sales to the FRA on its welfare, as well as the effects of more intense FRA maize purchase activity in a given district on the welfare of smallholder households in the district. Results suggest positive direct welfare effects on the minority of smallholders that sell to the FRA. We also find that, in the early years of the program, more intense FRA maize purchase activity in a district was associated with reductions in smallholder welfare, particularly among maize autarkic and net buying households. In later years, we find no evidence of such negative effects and some evidence of positive district‐level effects on maize net buyers.
Global hunger has been on the rise for the past three years, and the plight of hundreds of millions struggling with acute and chronic hunger has resulted largely from conflict: More than half of all undernourished people live in conflict-affected countries. In 2018, an estimated 41.3 million people were identified as being internally displaced because of armed conflict, and 29.4 million as refugees or asylum seekers. Currently, an estimated 600 million young people live in fragile or conflict-affected areas. These numbers are going up as conflicts have increased around the world.
Consumer's optimism about the economy jumped significantly this month and an ag economist says that's good news for the domestic demand picture. University of Missouri's Scott Brown said the preliminary results for June's Consumer Sentiment index, shows a 9 percent improvement over last month. The index measures how optimistic consumers feel about their finances and the state of the economy. “The economic conditions side of that index is up 6.7 percent and the index of consumer expectation is up 10.9 percent,” he says. “All those numbers are movements in the right direction after what was such a drastic decline in consumer sentiment previously.”
[前沿资讯] Coronavirus exposed fragility in our food system – it’s time to build something more resilient 进入全文
Most people rely on supermarkets, and these megastoresdominate our food economy. They are part of a system that depends on large-scale agriculture and production, smooth-flowing international food trade and fast turnaround times. But what happens when system vulnerabilities are exposed and they break down? What catches our fall? We need a resilient food system. This means going beyond the ecological idea of resilience as merely survival during times of stress, and instead proactively building a food system that can both respond quickly to changing circumstances and act as a safety net.